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Secure and efficient decoy-state quantum key distribution with
inexact pulse intensities
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Abstract
We present a general theorem for the efficient verification of the lower bound of single-photon
transmittance. We show how to do decoy-state quantum key distribution efficiently with large
random errors in the intensity control. In our protocol, the linear terms of fluctuation disappear
and only the quadratic terms take effect. We then show the unconditional security of decoy-state
method with whatever error pattern in intensities of decoy pulses and signal pulses provided that
the intensity of each decoy pulse is less than µ and the intensity of each signal pulse is larger than
µ′.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
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Introduction.— The decoy-state method[1, 2, 3, 4, 5] or some other methods[6, 7, 8]
can be used for two remote parties, Aice and Bob to do secure quantum key distribution
(QKD)[9, 10, 11] Even Alice only uses an imperfect source, e.g., a coherent light[12, 13, 14].
A secure final key can be distilled by using the separate theoretical results[15] if one knows
the upper bound of the fraction of tagged bits (those raw bits generated by multi-photon
pulses from Alice) or equivalently, the lower bound of the fraction of un-tagged bits (those
raw bits generated by single-photon pulses from Alice). The goal of decoy-state method is
to verify such bounds faithfully and efficiently.
Recently, a number of experiments on decoy-state QKD have been done[16, 17, 18]. However,
the existing theory of decoy-state method assumes the exact control of pulse intensities. A
new problem arose in practice is how to carry out the decoy-state method efficiently given
the inexact control of pulse intensity. In this Letter, we study this problem and we find
that if the intensity of each pulses are bounded in a reasonable range, we can still verify the
fraction of single-photon counts efficiently.
General idea.— There are two goals here, security and efficiency. For security, the verified
value of fraction of single-photon counts from our method must never larger than the true
value given whatever channel. For this part we should not assume any specific property
for the channel. This section will give a general method for secure verification of fraction
of un-tagged bits. We also want our protocol to be efficient. We want that, in the normal
situation where there is no Eve, the verified value of the fraction of single-photon counts is
rather close to the true value. We shall evaluate the efficiency of our protocol in another
section.
We start from the definition of the counting rate of certain pulses. Given a class of N
independent pulses, after Alice transmits them to Bob one by one, if Bob observes n counts
at his side, the counting rate for pulses in this class is s = n/N . If the state of source
in photon-number space is known, the fraction of single-photon counts is known given the
counting rate of all those single-photon pulses. We shall only consider how to find the single-
photon pulse counting rate hereafter. Suppose there are l different subclasses of independent
light pulses in a certain class. We denote the fractions of pulses in each subclasses by
a0, a1 · · · , al. If all these pulses are sent to Bob through whatever channel, the total counts
observed by Bob should be equal to the summation of the counts due to the pulses of each
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subclasses. Therefore we have
S =
l∑
0
aisi (1)
S is the counting rate of the whole class while si is the counting rate of the ith class.
The decoy-state method itself does not require the Possonian distribution of source light,
though it has been applied to the case of Possonian distribution[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Most generally,
in a 3-intensity decoy-state protocol, we consider 3 classes of states, Y0, Y, Y
′. Y0 contains all
vacuum pulses. Y contains three subclasses y0, y1, yc for vacuum pulses, single-photon pulses
and multi-photon pulses, respectively. Classes Y ′ contains 4 subclasses, y′0, y
′
1, y
′
c, y
′
d. We
shall use notations S0, S, S
′ for counting rates of classes of Y0, Y, Y
′, respectively; notations
{sx}, {s
′
x} for counting rates of subclasses {yx}, {y
′
x} and x can be 0,1,c,d. Using eq.(1) we
have
S = a0s0 + a1s1 + acsc
S ′ = a′0s
′
0 + a
′
1s
′
1 + a
′
cs
′
c + a
′
ds
′
d
. (2)
We shall regard S0, S, S
′ as known parameters since they are observed directly in the protocol.
In general, sx 6= s
′
x. Since all of them are non-negative, we can assume
s′1 = (1− r1)s1, s
′
c = ωcsc (3)
and (1− r1), ωc are non-negative numbers. If we define b
′
c = ωca
′
c, eqs.(2) is equivalent to

E = a1s1 + acsc
E ′ = a′1s1 + b
′
csc
(4)
and E = S − a0s0; E
′ = S ′ − b′0s
′
0 + f1 − a
′
ds
′
d and f1 = r1a
′
1s1. Therefore, it will be secure
if we find the smallest value s1 satisfying the equation above among all possible values for
parameters E,E ′, a1, ac, a
′
1, b
′
c. In general, this can be done numerically. To seek the lower
bound of s1 based on eqs.(4), we need first find the ranges of all parameters. As we are
going to show, the parameters of {ax, a
′
x} can be determined rather precisely by a type of
tomography. In our protocol, we mix all pulses from 3 classes randomly and we can simply
deduce ωc, f1 by classical random sampling theory. In a decoy-state method, we let subclass
y0(y
′
0), y1(y
′
1) contains all those vacuum pulses, single-photon pulses from class Y (Y
′), yc
contains all those multi-photon photon pulses from Y . Suppose the state of multi-photon
pulses from Y are ρc and state of class Y
′ is a convex form of ρc and other states. We
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require the state of a pulse from y′c be also ρc, same to that of yc. We emphasize that in the
protocol Alice does not need to know which pulse belongs to which subclass, we only need
that mathematically there exists such subclasses[2].
For certain two subclasses, if each pulses are independent and the states for pulses of
two subclasses are same, the pulses of one class can be regarded as samples of all pulses
of both classes, if all pulses are randomly mixed. Therefore, if each pulses of classes Y, Y ′
are independent and randomly mixed, the counting rates for pulses of subclasses {y1, y
′
1},
{yc, y
′
c}, {y0, Y0} and {y
′
0, Y0} can only be different by a statistical fluctuation. Therefore,
bounds of s0, s
′
0 are known and parameters of r1, ωc can be formulated by s1, sc and the
number of pulses from classical sampling theory[2]. If there are a larger number of pulses,
counting rates of the same state from different classes should be almost the same. For the
case of using exact intensities of 0, µ, µ′, the parameters of {ax} and {a
′
x} are known from
the information of the source state. For example, given coherent light of intensity 0, µ, µ′
for classes Y0, Y, Y
′, respectively, we have[2]
a0 = A0 = e
−µ; a1 = A1 = µe
−µ,
ac = Ac = 1− e
−µ − µe−µ
a′0 = A
′
0 = e
−µ′ , a′1 = A
′
1 = µ
′e−µ
′
bc
′ = ωcAc
′ = ωc
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
Ac
(5)
A theorem for calculation of s1.—Most directly, given the ranges of each parameters involved
in our protocol, we can solve Eqs.(4) numerically for the lower bound of single-photon counts.
However, since here there are a number of parameters, the numerical complexity can be huge.
We can avoid the complexity by the following treatment. Define K1 =
E
a1
, Kc =
E
ac
, K ′1 =
E′
a′
1
,
K ′c =
E′
b′c
. We can always find a meaningful solution for s1, sc if
K ′1 > K1 > 0, Kc > K
′
c > 0. (6)
As it is shown in Fig.(1), the solution of s1, sc is the crossing point of the two lines in sc− s1
plane. In this plane, it is easy to see that s1 value rises if K
′
1 or K
′
c decreases, or if K1 or
Kc rises. Therefore, the largest possible values of K
′
1, K
′
c and the smallest possible values of
K1, Kc will produce the lower bound of s1. We have the following theorem: Theorem 1:
Given eqs.(4), if eqs.(6) holds, the maximum of values of a0s0, a1, ac, f1 and minimum values
of a′0s
′
0, a
′
1, b
′
c, a
′
d will give the smallest result of s1 in eqs.(4). An alternative proof is shown
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FIG. 1: Graphics of eqs.(4) in s1−sc plane. Obviously, s1 value will be raised if K1 or Kc is raised,
or if K ′1 or K
′
c is decreased. This leads to our theorem 1.
in the appendix.
Decoy-state QKD with simple tomography.— We assume that the intensity fluctuation of
each individual pulse is random. Consider a protocol where Alice controls the intensity by a
feedback circuit. Each time she first produces a father pulse Fi whose intensity is not known
exactly. This pulse is then split into two daughter pulses: Di and Ωi. The intensity of pulse
Di is detected (e.g., by homodyne measurement) and this detection outcome determines the
instantaneous attenuation to Ωi to obtain the supposed intensity. There could be random
errors in detecting Di, in instantaneously controlling the attenuator. (The feedback circuit
is not drawn in Fig.(2) ).
Whenever Alice wants to use µ or µ′, she actually uses
µi = (1 + δi)µ¯; µ
′
i = (1 + δ
′
i)µ¯
′. (7)
She does not know each specific value of δi or δ
′
i. But as we shall show she can know the
averaged value of
µ¯ =
1
N
N∑
1
µi; µ¯
′ =
1
N
N ′∑
1
µ′i (8)
rather exactly. Here N,N ′ are number pulses in class Y, Y ′, respectively. Moreover, given
the fact
N∑
0
δi =
N ′∑
0
δ′i = 0 (9)
Alice can find rather narrow ranges for relevant parameters of her states by a type of simple
tomography. She can, as shown in Fig.(2) , every time first produces a pulse of intensity
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FIG. 2: Our proposed set-up for decoy-state QKD. D: detector, A: attenuator, BS: 50:50 beam-
splitter. The transmitted light is sent to Bob and the reflected light is detected by Alice.
2µi or 2µ
′
i by attenuation. The pulse is then split by a 50:50 beam-splitter. The trans-
mitted mode is sent to Bob, the reflected mode goes to a low efficient photon detector,
e.g., a detection efficiency of ξ ≤ 10%. We shall simply use the mathematical model of an
attenuator with transmittance ξ and a perfect yes/no detector. Suppose she has observed
the clicking rate of h+ d0 and h
′ + d0 for those N reflected pulses of intensity {µi} and N
′
reflected pulses of intensity {µ′i}, respectively. Here d0 is the dark count rate of her detector.
Mathematically,
N∑
0
(1− e−ξµi)/N = h (10)
This leads to the following facts after Taylor expansions:
µ¯ ≥ h/ξ; (11)
µ¯ ≤ µ+ =
1−
√
1− 2h(1 + ζ)
ξ(1 + ζ)
≈ h/ξ + h2(1 + ζ)/(2ξ) (12)
and notation ζ =
∑
δ2i /N ≤ δ
2, δ = Max{|δi|}. Combine Eqs(11,12) and the Taylor
expansion of Eq.(10) we obtain an even more tightened lower bound formula
µ¯ ≥ µ− = h/ξ + h
2/(2ξ)− ξ2µ3+/3! (13)
Replacing h with h′ in Eqs.(12,13) we can also bound µ¯′ by µ′
−
≤ µ¯′ ≤ µ′+. Similarly, we
shall use ζ ′ =
∑
δ′i
2/N ′ ≤ δ′2, δ′ = Max{δ′i}. Later, she can verify the bounds of all
parameters with the observed values h, h′ and the above formulas for µ¯, µ¯′. The true state
for a pulse in class Y is
1
N
N,∞∑
i,n=0
µni e
−µi
n!
|n〉〈n| = a0|0〉〈0|+ a1|1〉〈1|+ acρc (14)
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and a0, a1, are
∑
i e
−µi/N,
∑
i µie
−µi/N, ac = 1− a0− a1. Here ρc is the averaged state of all
multi-photon pulses in class Y . Obviously, if µ¯′ is sufficiently large than µ¯ and the intensity
error is not too large, we can also write ρµ′ in a convex form including ρc:
ρµ′ = a
′
0|0〉〈0|+ a
′
1|1〉〈1|+ a
′
cρc + a
′
dρd (15)
and a′0, a
′
1 are
∑
i e
−µ′
i/N ′,
∑
i µ
′
ie
−µ′
i/N ′, a′c =
P
µ′2i e
−µ′
i/N ′
P
µ2
i
e−µi/N
ac, a
′
d ≥ 0, ρd is a density operator.
We have the following bound values those parameters involved

e−µ+ ≤ a0 ≤ e
−µ−(1 + µ¯2δ2/2)
(1− µ−δ
2)µ−e
−µ− ≤ a1 ≤ µ+e
−µ+
ac ≤ 1− e
−µ+ − µ+e
µ+ + µ+δ
2
(16)


a′0 =
1
N
∑
e−µ
′
i ≥ e−µ¯
′
+
a′1 ≥ (1− µ
′
−
δ′2)µ′
−
e−µ
′
−
b′c ≥ ωc
µ′2
−
[1−e−µ−−µ−e
−µ
− ]
(1+δ2)µ2
+
e
µ′
−
−µ+
a′d ≥ 0
(17)
Efficiency evaluation.—We shall compare the efficiencies of two protocols, the ideal protocol
where the intensity of every light pulse in class Y or Y ′ is exactly µ or µ′ and our protocol
where the intensity of each light pulses is inexactly controlled. In a real experiment using
our protocol, Alice simply reads h, h′ values and then calculate the lower bound of s1. Here
we assume the model that Alice has observed
h = ξµ− ξ2µ2/2; h′ = ξµ′ − ξ2µ′2/2. (18)
Given these, we can calculate bounds for µ¯, µ¯′ by our earlier equations. We take the
following assumptions: µ = 0.2, µ′ = 0.6, ξ = 5% for Alice’s detection efficiency, linear
channel with transmittance η = 10−4, S0 = s0 = s
′
0 = 0, N = 10
9 and δ = δ′. In both
protocols we use f1 ≤ 10a1
√
s1
Nµe−µ
and ωc ≥ 1−10
√
1
sc(1−a0−a1)N
. To compare the efficiencies
of our protocol and the ideal protocol, we only need to compare solutions of eqs.(4) for two
protocols. We now denote s1, s˜1 to be the results of single-photon transmittance from our
protocol and the ideal protocol, respectively. The fraction of un-tagged bits from class Y ′ is
given by 

∆′1 = s1A
′
1(1− µδ
2)/(1− e−ηµ
′
)
∆˜′1 = s˜1A
′
1/(1− e
−ηµ′)
(19)
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TABLE I: Efficiency comparison of our protocol and an ideal protocol.
δ 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
T 99.8% 99.6% 99.2% 98.7% 98.0% 97.2% 96.3%
R 99.7% 99.0% 97.9% 96.3% 94.4% 91.9% 89.2%
∆′1 is for our protocol, ∆˜
′
1 is for the ideal protocol. We shall calculate T = s1/s˜1, R = ∆
′
1/∆˜
′
1.
We find very good results given various δ values. (See details in table 1.) Moreover, the
results our protocol can be even improved because there are obviously better ways to bound
ζ, ζ ′ more tightly. For example, suppose we know that the fluctuation of more than 90% of
the pulses is less than 10%, even though the largest fluctuation is 50%, we have ζ ≤ 3.4%
and we can verify a R ≥ 96% with δ2 being replaced by ζ in all equations. For another
example, Alice can use two detectors of efficiency ξ1, ξ2 to tightly verify the upper bound of
ζ : Every time she first produces a pulse of intensity 3x, (x can be 0, around µ or µ′). She
equally divides the pulse into 3 modes, mode b ia sent to Bob, modes 1 and 2 are sent to
detector 1 and 2 respectively. Using the number of counts of each detector, she can verify
an upper bound of ζ value only a little bit larger than the true value of ζ . (This will be
reported elsewhere separately.)
Our theorem 1 is based on the conditions of eqs.(6). These conditions are related to
the statistical fluctuations which are dependent on the value of s1, sc. But we can verify
these conditions before knowing the exact values of s1, sc. First, we assume sc > 2η. This
assumption leads to s1 < η. Here η is the channel transmittance. We can assume so safely.
If the assumption sc > 2η is incorrect, then s1 > η which is a quite good result. If the
assumption of sc > 2η is correct, then our calculation based on this is alright. In whatever
case, it is secure if we use the assumption for calculation and we then use Min{η, s1} (s1 is
the calculated result.) Therefore we can have bound values of
f1 ≤ 10a1
√
η
a1N
; ωc ≥ 1−
√
1
2ηacN
. (20)
Given these, we can easily verify eqs.(6) and then use our theorem 1 safely.
Effect of inexact vacuum pulses in class Y0.— In general, S0 6= 0. We can safely set s
′
0 = 0
according to our theorem 1 and we only need to consider the upper bound of s0. Asymp-
totically, we can simply replace s0 by S0 even though pulses in Y0 are not strictly vacuum.
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Let’s assume the actual state in Y0 is ρ0 = (1 − ǫ0)|0〉〈0| + ǫ1|1〉〈1| + ǫmρm. Here ρm is a
state of multi-photon pulses, ǫm = O(ǫ
2
1), ǫ1 << 1 and ǫ0 = ǫ1 + ǫm. Therefore, we have
S0 = (1− ǫ0)s0 + ǫ1s1 + ǫmsm. (21)
This leads to a preliminary upper bound of s0 ≤
S0
1−ǫ0
. We then replace s0 in eqs.(4) and
solve the equation for lower bound of s1. We assume s1 ≥ 1.5S0 at this stage, otherwise
the protocol should be discarded. Now we consider eq.(21) again. We have a new bound of
s0 ≤
S0
1−ǫ0
− ǫ1s1 ≤ S0.
The unconditional security for whatever error pattern.— Suppose we don’t use the feedback
control for Ωi in Fig.(2). Most generally, the intensity fluctuation of each pulses is not
perfectly random. Now the probability for a pulse from yx or from y
′
x can change slightly
at different time intervals therefore sx can be slightly different from s
′
x in the whole time
series even there is no statistical fluctuation. For example, it is possible that in a certain
time interval, the probability of using y1 (y
′
1) is less (larger) than the averaged probability
of using y1 (y
′
1), Eve can produce a certain time-dependent channel transmittance for those
single-photon pulses sent from Alice and the averaged counting rates of y1 and y
′
1 in the
whole time series can be different from each other, even there is no statistical fluctuation.
This is to say, in general, pulses of sub-class yx and y
′
x in principle can not be regarded
as randomly mixed if the intensities of each pulses are not exactly controlled. We need a
separate security proof for a protocol with whatever pattern of intensity error. We now prove
that the protocol is secure if µi ≤ µ and µ
′
i ≥ µ
′.
We start from a virtual protocol, Protocol 1: At each time i in sending a pulse to Bob,
Alice produces a bipartite state
ρi(2) = p0|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ p|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ ρµ + p
′|z2〉〈z2| ⊗ ρµ′
i
(22)
and announces the value of µ′i. Here ρx =
∑
∞
n=0
xne−x
n!
|n〉〈n|, the value µ keeps to be constant
but µ′i can change from time to time and µ
′
i is not less than a constant value µ
′. States {|zx〉}
are orthogonal to each other for different x (x = 0, 1, 2) and p0 + p + p
′ = 1. Alice keeps
the light pulse in the first subspace and sends out the pulse in the second subspace of the
bipartite state to Bob, i runs from 1 to Nt, the number of total pulses sent to Bob. Later,
Alice measures her states ({|zx〉}) and she can know which pulse in the second subspace of the
bipartite state belongs to which class (Y0, Y or Y
′). As we have shown in Eqs.(5), state ρµ can
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be written in the convex form of ρµ = A0|0〉〈0|+A1|1〉〈1|+Acρc and Acρc =
∑
∞
2
µne−µ
n!
|n〉〈n|.
Since µ′i ≥ µ
′, we always have the following convex form for state ρµ′
i
ρµ′
i
= A′1|1〉〈1|+ A
′
cρc + (1− A
′
1 − A
′
c)ρ
i
e (23)
where A′1 = µ
′e−µ
′
, A′c =
Acµ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
. Obviously, the specific formula for ρie exists but it is
unimportant here since we only need the fact that ρie is a density operator[2]. To anybody
outside Alice’s lab, Alice could have used a tripartite state of
ρi(3) = p0|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
+p|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ (A0|v0〉〈v0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ A1|v1〉〈v1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ Ac|vc〉〈vc| ⊗ ρc)
+p′|z2〉〈z2| ⊗
[
A′1|v
′
1〉〈v
′
1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|+ A
′
c|v
′
c〉〈v
′
c| ⊗ ρ
′
c + (1−A1 − A
′
c)|v
′
e〉〈v
′
e| ⊗ ρ
i
e
]
(24)
and those states in the second subspace are all orthogonal to each other. Alice keeps the
pulses in the first and second subspaces and sends out the pulse in the third subspace to Bob.
Given this, we can define 3 classes Y0, Y, Y
′ of pulses: if Alice obtained her measurement
outcome of |z0〉, |z1〉 or |z2〉 in the first subspace, the corresponding pulse sent out is regarded
as a pulse of class Y0, Y or Y
′. We can also define 3 subclasses y0, y1, yc of Y and 3 sub-
classes y˜′1, y˜
′
c, y
′
e of Y
′: if Alice obtains her measurement outcome of |v0〉, |v1〉 or |vc〉 in the
second subspace, the corresponding pulse sent out is regarded as a pulse of sub-class y0, y1
or yc; if Alice obtains her measurement outcome of |v
′
1〉, |v
′
c〉 or |v
′
e〉 in the second subspace,
the corresponding pulse sent out is regarded as a pulse of sub-classes y˜′1, y˜
′
c or y
′
e. Here y˜
′
1
is a bit different from the sub-class y′1 defined before: y
′
1 defined before contains all those
single-photon pulses of Y ′ while y˜′1 here possibly does not contain all single-photon pulses
in Y ′ if µ′i < µ
′, since some of single-photon pulses from Y ′ are regarded as elements of y′e
now, according to our definition. Similarly, y˜′c here is also a bit different from y
′
c as defined
before. Since pulses of sub-classes y˜′1, y˜
′
c occur with constant probabilities, pulses from sub-
class y1, y˜
′
1, pulses from yc, y˜
′
c and pulses from y0, Y0 are randomly mixed. For simplicity
in presentation, we only consider the asymptotic case here, i.e., the counting rates for two
sub-classes containing the same state must be equal to each other. We can use the following
constraints to verify the single-photon transmittance s1:

A1s1 + Acsc = E
A′1s1 + A
′
csc ≤ S
′
(25)
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and E = S−e−µs0, S, S
′ are the counting rates of classes Y, Y ′, s1 is the counting rate of class
y1 or y˜
′
1, sc is the counting rate of class yc or y˜
′
c, A1 = µe
−µ, Ac = 1−A0−A1. The value s0
can be deduced from the observed counting rate of class Y0 by classical sampling theory. In
obtaining the second constraint above, we have used the fact thatNtp
′(A′1s1+A
′
csc) ≤ Ntp
′S ′,
i.e., the number of counts caused by part of pulses (y′1∪y
′
c) of class Y
′ cannot be larger than
the number of counts caused by all pulses of class Y ′. Here, in using Eqs.(25), Alice actually
does not need any information of which pulse belong to which sub-class. Therefore she can
discard the pulse in the second subspace of the tripartite state ρi(3), consequently, she can
just use the bipartite state ρi(2) and obtain s1 value through Eqs.(25). In this protocol,
Alice announces µ′i value at each time but it is still secure since her announcement does
not change the fact that pulses of each sub-classes y0, y1, yc, y
′
1, y
′
c will occur with constant
probabilities therefore classical randomly sampling theory works, so that Eqs.(25) holds.
(Definitely, the protocol is also secure if Alice does not announce µ′i value at each time.)
Suppose in another protocol, Protocol 2, Alice uses source state γi which can in principle
be obtained through attenuating ρi(2) in the second subspace by a factor χi. If Eve can
attack this protocol effectively with scheme A then Eve can also attack Protocol 1 effectively
by first attenuating the pulses by a time-dependent factor χi and then using scheme A. Given
this fact, we conclude that any source can be used securely if that source can in principle be
obtained through attenuating state ρi(2) in the second subspace. This gives rise to Lemma
1: Alice can use Eqs.(25) safely if the source she has actually used in principle can be
produced by attenuating ρi(2) in the second subspace. This leads to Lemma 2: Alice can
safely use Eqs.(25) for lower bound value of s1 if she actually at each time had used any
state Wi = p0|z0〉〈z0| ⊗ |0〉0| + p|z1〉〈z1| ⊗ ρνi + p
′|z2〉〈z2| ⊗ ρν′
i
provided that νi ≤ µ and
ν ′i ≥ µ
′. Proof: We denote the (time-dependent) attenuation factor ωi =
νi
µ
. In protocol 1,
we can set µ′i =
ν′iµ
νi
for the bipartite state ρi(2) and the protocol with such a setting is secure
since
ν′
i
µ
νi
≥ ν ′i ≥ µ
′. After attenuating ρi(2) by the factor ωi in the second subspace, ρi(2) is
changed to state Wi. According to our lemma 1, Alice can use Wi directly and uses Eqs.(25)
for lower bound of s1. Moreover, it is of no difference if Alice measures her states {|zx〉}
in the very beginning. If she does this, the protocol with source state Wi is changed into a
3-intensity protocol with intensities 0, {νi}, {ν
′
i} and νi ≤ µ, ν
′
i ≥ µ
′, with probability p0, p, p
′
for using each of them at each time. Consequently we arrive at Theorem 2: The 3-intensity
protocol is secure with whatever error pattern for intensities of decoy pulses (class Y ) and
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signal pulses (class Y ′) provided that 1) the intensity of each decoy pulses is less than µ and
the intensity of each signal pulses is larger than µ′; 2) we use Eqs.(25) to calculate s1. Our
result here can obviously be extended to the non-asymptotic case. To do so, we only need
to 1) replace s1, sc by s
′
1, s
′
c in the second constraint of Eqs.(25); 2) give the possible ranges
for difference between s1 and s
′
1 and difference between sc, s
′
c with exponential certainty by
classical random sampling theory[2]; 3) solve Eqs.(25) numerically in the ranges and find
the smallest s1.
Although the method shown above is unconditionally secure, in the efficiency criterion,
we can have a better choice, e.g., we use the protocol presented in Ref[19]. However, there
we request using the same father pulse and exact control of attenuation. Here in Eqs.25 we
don’t need these and it is unconditionally secure. The result here can apply to all existing
experiments immediately, i.e., we only need to redo the calculation of s1 using our method
and the existing experimental data but we don’t have to redo the experiment itself.
In summary, we have shown that decoy-state method QKD is secure and efficient even
there are errors in the intensity control.
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APPENDIX I
Suppose S1, Sc are solution of Eq.(4). Then S1 must satisfy
S1 =
b′cE − acE
′
a1b′c − a
′
1ac
(26)
Consider another set of parameters {a˜x ≤ ax, a˜
′
x ≥ a
′
x}, b˜
′
c ≥ b
′
c, f˜1 ≤ f1, s˜0 ≤ s0, s˜
′
0 ≥ s
′
0.
We define E˜ ′ = S ′ − a˜′0s˜
′
0 + f˜1 ≤ E
′, E˜ = S − a˜0s˜0 ≥ E. We suppose s˜1, s˜c are solution for
eqs.(4) with those tilde parameters. Therefore s˜1 should satisfy
s˜1 =
b˜′cE˜ − a˜cE˜
′
a˜1b˜′c − a˜
′
1a˜c
≥
b˜′cE − a˜cE
′
a1b˜′c − a
′
1a˜c
(27)
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Since b˜′c ≥ b
′
c, a˜c ≤ ac, we can assume b˜
′
c = (1 + λ1)bc, a˜c = (1 + λ2)ac and λ1, λ2 ≥ 0. Also
we denote χ = b
′
cE
acE′
, γ = a1b
′
c
aca′1
and we have
s˜1 ≥ S1(1 +
λ1χ+λ2
χ−1
− λ1γ+λ2
γ−1
)
= S1(1 +
(λ2+λ1)(γ−χ)
(χ−1)(γ−1)
).
(28)
While we know that γ
χ
=
a1b′c/(a
′
1
ac)
b′cE/(acE
′)
=
K ′
1
K1
> 1, eqs.(28) is changed to s˜1 ≥ S1. This completes
the proof of our theorem.
APPENDIX II
In this appendix we derive the inequalities of (16,17). First, a0 =
1
N
∑
e−µi =
1
N
e−µ¯
∑
e−µ¯δi. After the Taylor expansion, we have
∑
e−µ¯δi =
∑
(1− µ¯δi +
µ¯2δ2i
2
− · · ·). (29)
Using the fact
∑
δi = 0 and δ =Max{|δi|}, we obtain
e−µ¯ ≤ a0 ≤ e
−µ¯(1 + µ¯2δ2/2). (30)
Further, the fact that µ− ≤ µ¯ ≤ µ+ leads to
e−µ¯+ ≤ a0 ≤ e
−µ¯−(1 + µ¯2δ2/2). (31)
This is the first inequality in Eq.(16). We have the following equivalent form for a1 =
1
N
∑
µie
−µi :
a1 =
1
N
µ¯e−µ¯
∑
(1 + δi)(1− µ¯δi +
1
2
µ¯2δ2i − · · ·) (32)
This means
µ¯e−µ¯(1− µ¯δ2) ≤ a1 ≤ µ¯e
−µ¯ (33)
which gives rise to
µ−e
−µ−(1− µ−δ
2) ≤ a1 ≤ µ+e
−µ+ , (34)
the second inequality of Eq.(16). Next we consider ac = 1−a0−a1 = 1−
1
N
∑
(e−µi+µie
−µi).
The As a result of Taylor expansion
a1 = 1− e
−µ¯(1 + µ¯−
δ2µ¯2
2
+ · · ·) (35)
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which leads to
1− e−µ¯ − µ¯e−µ¯ ≤ ac ≤ 1− e
−µ¯ − µ¯e−µ¯ + e−µ¯µ¯2δ2/2. (36)
Given the bounds of of µ¯, we have
1− e−µ¯− − µ¯−e
−µ¯− ≤ ac ≤ 1− e
−µ¯+ − µ¯+e
−µ¯+ + e−µ¯+µ¯2+δ
2/2. (37)
The derivations of the first two inequalities in Eq.(17) are same with that of Eq.(16). We
only show the third one here. To obtain the lower bound, we have
∑
µ′2i e
−µ′
i/N ′∑
µ2i e
−µi/N
≥
µ¯′2e−µ¯
′
(1 + δ2)µ¯2e−µ¯
. (38)
Therefore we have
a′c ≥
µ¯′2eµ¯−µ¯
′
ac
µ¯2(1 + δ2)
≥
µ′2
−
(1− e−µ¯− − µ¯−e
−µ¯−)
(1 + δ2)µ2+e
µ′
−
−µ+
. (39)
Given that b′c = ωca
′
c, we arrive at the third inequality of Eq.(17).
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